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Abstract
Background: The international community strongly advocates the implementation of multi-sectoral surveillance
policies for an effective approach to antibiotic resistance, in line with the One Health concept. To comply with
these international recommendations, the Vietnamese government has issued an inter-ministerial surveillance
strategy for antibiotic resistance, including an integrated surveillance system. However, one may question the ability
and willingness of surveillance stakeholders to implement the collaborations required. To assess the feasibility of
operationalising this strategy within the national context, we explored the role of key stakeholders in the strategy,
as well as their abilities to comply with it.
Methods: We conducted a qualitative approach based on an iterative stakeholder mapping and analysis, in three
distinct steps: (1) a description of the structure of the national surveillance strategy (literature review, key informant
interviews); (2) an analysis of the key stakeholders’ positions regarding the strategy (semi-structured interviews); (3)
the identification of factors influencing the operationalisation of the collaborative surveillance strategy (comparison
of data collected at the first and second steps).
Results: The mapping of the surveillance system, as well as the characterisation of key stakeholders according to
organisational and functional attributes, underlined that inter-sectoral surveillance initiatives do exist, but that the
organisation of the national surveillance system remains highly silo-oriented.
Based on stakeholder perspectives, we identified seven factors that may influence the implementation of the One
Health strategy at national level: governance and operational frameworks, divergence of institutional cultures, level
of knowledge, technical capacities, allocation of resources, conflicting commercial interests and influence of
international partners.
Conclusions: The study suggests that the operationalisation of the collaborative surveillance strategy requires
the full adhesion of stakeholders and the provision of appropriate resources. Based on these findings, we
have proposed a guidance framework together with recommendations to move towards a more suitable
governance and operational model for One Health surveillance of antibiotic resistance in Vietnam.
To lever and promote successful inter-sectoral collaboration, a participatory “learning by doing” process could
be applied to guide, frame and mentor stakeholders through the identification of appropriate levels of collaboration,
depending on the expected positive impacts on the value of surveillance.
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Background
Antibiotic resistance (ABR) has been recognised as a
global health issue. Resistant bacteria exist in humans,
animals, food and the environment, and there are no
barriers to the transmission of resistance genes across
bacterial species and compartments. Bacteria can be nat-
urally resistant; however, exposure to antibiotics is one
of the main drivers for the emergence and spread of re-
sistance genes [1, 2].
Surveillance aims to collect data over time on health
events (disease, food contamination, syndrome, etc.) in a
specific population to study its evolution in time and
space, and thus inform appropriate decisions for the
mitigation of related risks [3].
Due to the complex epidemiology of ABR, the inter-
national community strongly advocates the implementa-
tion of integrated surveillance systems at national,
regional and global levels, referring to the One Health
concept which promotes collaborative efforts across
sectors and disciplines to achieve optimal health for
humans, animals and ecosystems [4]. The World Health
Organisation (WHO) has issued a Global Action Plan
on Antimicrobial resistance, in collaboration with the
World Organisation of Animal health (OIE) and the
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) [5]. This ac-
tion plan calls for the development of knowledge around
ABR through surveillance and research. A guideline on
Integrated Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance
(AGISAR) has been issued by the WHO advisory group
[6]. This guideline provides the basic information re-
quired for countries to establish an integrated surveil-
lance of ABR, including antibiotic use (ABU) in humans,
food-producing animals and retail food. Several expected
outputs of this integrated approach are described in the
literature: a better understanding of transmission routes
across compartments, the identification of the relative
importance of the different reservoirs in the emergence
and maintenance of resistance in humans, the study of
the correlation between ABU and ABR within and be-
tween sectors (namely animal, human and environmen-
tal), the assessment of intervention impacts within and
between sectors [2, 7].
However, such integrated surveillance systems call for
collaboration involving various governmental authorities
working at different scales, as well as private stake-
holders, that may well have divergent interests, different
surveillance objectives and non-standardised methods
for data collection. The ways in which surveillance
stakeholders appropriate and implement these recom-
mendations are therefore open to question.
In Vietnam, the Government recognises that ABR rep-
resents a multi-dimensional risk and a threat to public
health, trade, the economy and, more generally, the
over-all sustainable development of the country.1 While
the current health and economic impacts remain un-
known, many studies show that the level of resistance to
antibiotics is very high in the human and animal sectors
[8, 9]. Supported by international organisations and co-
operation, and in line with international recommenda-
tions, the Vietnamese authorities have developed an
inter-ministerial strategy to combat the phenomenon, in-
cluding an integrated surveillance system for ABR2,.3
To assess the feasibility of operationalising the ABR
surveillance strategy in the national context, we explored
how the key stakeholders understood and perceived the
inter-sectoral approach promoted by national policy,
which is strongly framed by international recommenda-
tions. We aimed to identify the rationale behind stake-
holders’ willingness to adopt the collaborative system,
and to identify factors that may impede or enhance the
implementation of a One Health surveillance system for
ABR in Vietnam. Based on these findings, we have pro-
posed a guidance framework and recommendations to
move towards a more suitable governance and oper-
ational model for sustainable One Health surveillance of
ABR in Vietnam.
Methods
This study adopted a qualitative approach relying on in-
ductive inference [10, 11] based on stakeholder perspec-
tives. We based our reasoning on an iterative stakeholder
mapping and analysis, conducted in three distinct steps
detailed below: (1) a description of the structure of the na-
tional surveillance strategy in conjunction with inter-
national recommendations (based on a literature review
and key informant interviews); (2) an analysis of the key
stakeholders’ positions regarding the strategy (based on
semi-structured interviews); (3) the identification of fac-
tors influencing the operationalisation of the collaborative
surveillance strategy.
First, we carried out a structural analysis of the ABR
surveillance strategy (including ABU). The objective was
to (i) describe the international and national framework
(regulations, standards) in which the national strategy is
anchored, (ii) detail the organisation of the ongoing and
future national surveillance system, (iii) analyse the role,
mandates and activities of different stakeholders (institu-
tion, organisation or profession), as well as their interac-
tions (including collaborations and information flow).
This first step aimed at characterising and mapping the
current surveillance system of ABR in Vietnam, as well
as the organisational and functional attributes of the
stakeholders involved.
Data were collected from two sources. First, a litera-
ture review was conducted on international recommen-
dations, standards and guidelines, official Vietnamese
documents (national action plans, legal instruments,
etc.) and reports (scientific, assessment and analytical
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reports), related to ABR surveillance in all the different
sectors. Three informants were then identified as re-
source persons based on their involvement in the field of
ABR or their knowledge about the health system organ-
isation in Vietnam or the antibiotics supply chain; these
were interviewed to obtain an overview of key stake-
holders and activities in the field of ABR surveillance.
At the end of this first step, the main stakeholders
concerned with the issue of ABR were identified and
characterised according to twelve organisational and
functional attributes, such as professional sector, type
of activities, position in the strategy, engagement in
the tasks assigned or inter and intra-sectoral interac-
tions. The complete list of these attributes is pre-
sented in Table 1.
Secondly, based on the previous structural mapping,
we selected the 21 key stakeholders identified to be
“operating4” (i.e. stakeholder officially tasked with sur-
veillance activities) or “influencing4” (i.e. stakeholder
officially identified as supporting surveillance activities).
We added 4 “absent4” stakeholders (i.e. stakeholder
without any assigned role in the surveillance strategy)
because of their strong involvement in ABR surveil-
lance activities or the antibiotic business. In total, we
invited 39 informants5 representative of the 25 selected
stakeholders to be interviewed. Among them, 12 “oper-
ating”, 8 “influencing” and 5 “absent” informants ac-
cepted to participate to the study through individual or
collective semi-structured interviews. These 25 infor-
mants are identified as key actors of the surveillance
system (henceforth referred to as KASS) to explore
their abilities to comply with the inter-sectoral surveil-
lance strategy. The interview grid included 5 parts: i)
professional background of the informant and descrip-
tion of his/her activities; ii) potential role in the surveil-
lance process and interactions with other stakeholders;
iii) knowledge about the Vietnamese strategy to combat
ABR and about surveillance activities in the different
sectors; iv) identification of potential changes to im-
prove ABR surveillance in Vietnam; v) point of view re-
garding the international guidance to support countries
in implementing One Health surveillance.
Table 1 Organisational and functional attributes for the characterisation of the structural position of stakeholders involved in the
inter-sectorial surveillance strategy of antibiotic resistance in Vietnam
Attribute Definition Possible value
Category of stakeholder Describes the category the stakeholder belongs to Government authorities, national research institutes, private sector,
international partners
Territorial level Describes the geographical level at which the
stakeholder works
Sub-national, national, supra-national
Supervising authority Describes the institution which has a direct
authority over the stakeholder
Prime Minister, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of
Environment, Ministry of Finances, Ministry of industries and trade,
Ministry of sciences and technology, provincial people’s committee
Professional sector Describes the sector in which the stakeholder
works
Animal health, husbandry management, animal feed, human health,
food processing and distribution, food safety, plant health, wildlife,
fisheries, soil and water, antibiotic production/distribution
Stakeholder’s structural
position in the surveillance
strategy
Describes the role of the stakeholder as defined
in official documents framing the surveillance
strategy
Operating (stakeholder officially tasked with surveillance activities),
influencing (stakeholder officially identified as supporting surveillance
activities), absent (stakeholder without any assigned role in the
surveillance strategy)
Stakeholder’s activity status
regarding tasks assigned
Describes stakeholder’s engagement in
undertaking or supporting surveillance activities
Active (stakeholder already engaged), prospective (stakeholder about
to be engaged), absent (stakeholder not engaged)
Surveillance component Describes the surveillance component in which
the stakeholder undertakes action
ABR and or ABU in hospitals, ABR and or ABU in community, ABR and
or ABU in food-producing animals, ABR and or ABU in companion
animals, ABR and or ABU in plant, ABR and or ABU in wildlife,
ABR in soil and water, ABR in food
Surveillance activities Describes at which stage of the surveillance
process the stakeholder is involved
Surveillance planning, data collection, data reporting, data sharing,
data management, data analysis and interpretation, data communication,
data dissemination
Collaborations Describes at which stage of the surveillance
process collaborations occur
Orientation, coordination, planning, data collection, data analysis/
interpretation, dissemination, communication
Interacting partner Describes, for each collaboration, with which
partner the stakeholder interacts
Any of the other institutions identified
Collaboration status Describes the engagement of partners in
the collaboration
Planned, ongoing
Type of collaboration Describes the type of collaboration in place Technical and financial support, inter-sectoral collaborations
ABR Antibiotic resistance, ABU Antibiotic usage
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We adopted a participatory approach to conduct these
interviews. Informants were first asked to map the system
in which their ABR surveillance-related activities take
place, including interactions with other stakeholders. In-
vestigators then guided them to draw their ‘ideal’ inte-
grated surveillance system, i.e. additional surveillance
components to be included, relevant inter-sectoral collab-
orations, governance model and necessary resources. They
could choose for the interview to be conducted either in
English or in Vietnamese. All participants had to sign a
consent form before the interview began. Participant and
institution anonymity was assured.
Each interview was conducted by a team including at
least two or three researchers depending on the context
and the need for translation. The number of individuals
attending the interview ranged from one to six. The
average duration of the interviews was 90 min. Initial
handwritten notes were first captured in a transcript to-
gether with a picture of the system mapped by the par-
ticipant(s). Then, from each interview, we analysed the
participants’ discourse to bring out a set of abilities’ at-
tributes characterising KASS regarding their understand-
ing of the strategy, as well as their perception and level
of adhesion to the collaborative approach promoted at
the policy level. Based on these attributes, we then de-
scribed KASS’ abilities to comply with surveillance strat-
egy prescriptions.
In the third step, we analysed how the abilities of
stakeholders (step 2) to comply with the surveillance
strategy may influence the implementation of the collab-
orative surveillance system as defined at policy level
(step 1). We identified relevant factors that could act as
levers for, or barriers to, the operationalisation of inter-
sectoral and multi-disciplinary collaborations. Based on
this analysis, we have proposed new governance and op-
erational modalities for ABR surveillance in Vietnam
that may open the way to a more effective and sustain-
able One Health surveillance system that considers
stakeholder constraints and realities.
Results
Structural analysis of the Vietnamese surveillance
strategy
The Vietnamese strategy to combat antibiotic resistance
The Vietnamese strategy to combat ABR is set out in
two main documents. In 2013, the Ministry of Health is-
sued a Global Action Plan, common to the human, ani-
mal and environmental health sectors. This action plan
provides for surveillance systems to be set up in the hu-
man sector, at the hospital and community level (resist-
ance and consumption), in food-producing animals and
in plants (use only). In 2017, the Ministry of Agriculture
enacted its own action plan that includes a more specific
description of how the animal health sector is to handle
the tasks assigned by the Global Action Plan. Surveil-
lance of resistance and usage is planned in livestock and
aquaculture. In addition, in 2015, a memorandum was
signed between the Ministers in charge of Health, Agri-
culture, Environment and Trade, in the presence of
international partners; it underlines the commitment of
the Vietnamese government to combatting ABR through
an inter-sectoral approach. In 2016, a National Steering
Committee was established at a ministerial level to
monitor the implementation of the Global Action Plan.
It is chaired by the Ministry of Health, assisted by the
Ministry of Agriculture, and brings together representa-
tives of the Ministry of the Environment and the Minis-
try of Trade. Sub-committees have been set up parallel
to this to manage the technical implementation of the
strategy in the different domains.
The organisation of the collaborative surveillance system
for ABR in Vietnam
Sectoral surveillance components are now implemented,
or are about to be, in the main domains, as advised in
international guidance [5, 6]: humans, food-producing
animals, food. The Ministry of Health has been tasked
to survey two domains (hospitals and community),
which are supervised by two separate departments, re-
spectively the department of medical services and the
department of preventive medicine. Regarding animals,
the department of Animal Health has been officially
assigned by the Ministry of Agriculture to take over the
surveillance of ABR and ABU in food producing
animals.
The Global Action Plan does not plan a surveillance
component for the environment. Only the monitoring of
antibiotic residues is mentioned.
The structural characterisation and mapping of the
stakeholders in relation to the national surveillance
strategy
We have identified 40 stakeholders directly concerned
by the operations of the national surveillance system. 20
belong to governmental authorities (animal health and
production, human health, environmental health, plant
health, food safety, etc.), six to national research insti-
tutes and universities (including hospitals), six to inter-
national partners (inter-governmental organisations and
foreign research institutes), and 8 to the private sector
(feed mills, human and animal pharmaceutical compan-
ies, veterinary drug sellers). They intervene in 7 profes-
sional sectors: animal health, human health, plant
health, environmental health, food safety, animal pro-
duction, drug manufacturing and distribution. Figure 1
represents a simplified mapping of the stakeholders
based on their role in the strategy (operating, influen-
cing, absent4) and their current involvement in
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surveillance activities (active, prospective, inactive4).
This onion mapping also provides an overview of stake-
holder interactions in terms of chain of command or
legal supervision, technical and financial support and
inter-sectoral collaborations.
Within the governmental agencies, at the operating
level, the public health sector is more active than the
animal health sector. However, in the preventive medi-
cine sector, in charge of the surveillance at the commu-
nity level, the involvement of the competent authority
remains low and progress in this area is mainly own to
the strong commitment of national research institutes.
Currently, the cross-sector collaboration remains prin-
cipally at the policy level, with the constitution of the
National Steering Committee. At the operational level,
although some inter-sectoral activities are officially
stipulated, the operation of the national surveillance
system remains highly silo-oriented. Surveillance com-
ponents are supervised by separate departments with
limited communication and collaboration among them,
even when under the same ministry. Research institutes
are strongly involved in all the different sectors and
some, although absent from the surveillance strategy,
are involved in certain surveillance activities, either in
support of the competent authorities or independently.
For instance, the National Institute of Nutrition has ini-
tiated the establishment of the surveillance component
for food, which was not initially planned in the national
strategy, while the National Institute for Hygiene and
Epidemiology has developed a project aiming at
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Fig. 1 Organisational and functional mapping of the main stakeholders of the ABR surveillance strategy in Vietnam.
Surveillance in food-producing animals = Department of Animal Health: management of the surveillance of ABR and ABU in food-producing animals;
National center for veterinary hygiene 1: leading laboratory and central unit for ABR, sampling, laboratory testing; Regional animal health office:
sampling, laboratory testing; National institute of veterinary research: technical and scientific advice; Provincial veterinary services: collecting data on
antibiotic sales and monitoring usage at farm level; Animal pharmaceutical companies, feed mills and drug sellers: reporting sale data; Customs:
reporting data on antibiotic importation. Surveillance in humans =Medical services department: management of the surveillance of ABR and ABU in
hospitals, central unit for ABR and ABU in hospitals; Hospitals: laboratory testing and reporting data about ABR and ABU; Preventive medicine
department: management of the surveillance of ABR and ABU in community; National Institute of hygiene and epidemiology: laboratory testings and
central unit (national reference laboratory) for ABR in community. Surveillance in food of animal origin = National institute of nutrition: management
and central unit for ABR surveillance, sampling, laboratory testing
Bordier et al. BMC Public Health  (2018) 18:1136 Page 5 of 14
monitoring resistances at the community level in
healthy humans.
International partners are strongly involved in the field
of ABR surveillance and provide national authorities
with support on a bilateral basis in their respective fields
of competencies. They are also closely connected, both
in an intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral manner.
The private sector is intended to play an active role
in the monitoring of ABU in the animal domain, and
certain stakeholders of the antibiotics market chain
(pharmaceutical companies and drug sellers) are re-
quired to report sales data to governmental bodies.
Even though not mentioned in official documents, the
feed mills, which are the main providers of antibiotics
for animal production should be also solicited by the
Department of Livestock to report data on usage. The
private sector (healthcare facilities and antibiotic busi-
ness sector) is absent from the surveillance strategy
for ABR and ABU in humans.
Abilities of the stakeholders involved in the national
surveillance strategy
The 25 interviewees belong to 4 professional categories:
7 to governmental authorities (animal health and pro-
duction, human health, environmental health), 5 to na-
tional research institutes (including hospitals), 6 to
international partners (inter-governmental organisations
and foreign research institutes) and 7 to the private sec-
tor (feed mills, human and animal pharmaceutical com-
panies, veterinary drug sellers).
The interviews and participatory mapping sessions en-
abled us to draw 10 attributes (Table 2) to characterise
participants regarding (i) their posture (attitude and pos-
ition toward the stakes at play in the national strategy),
(ii) their technical capital for the implementation of the
strategy (capabilities and resources to technically comply
with the surveillance strategy), and (iii) their social cap-
ital to successfully enable and design inter-institutional
relationships. These three attributes are closely linked
and influence each other. Both social and technical capi-
tals are notions used in sociology and refer to resources
that social stakeholders can rely on and use for their
own interest. Bourdieu [12] defined social capital as the
entire set of sustainable relationship networks that a so-
cial stakeholder (in our context, we are speaking of indi-
viduals from institutions, organisations or profession)
can mobilise. As a complement to this notion, technical
capital is defined as the sum of the stakeholders’ profes-
sional network ties and their technical skills, knowledge
and resources [13]. Assessing and qualifying the efficacy
of such relationship networks and resources require a
complex qualitative process that calls upon indicators
such as trust, reputation, knowledge and know-how, etc.
Thus, we had to accept, within the framework of our
Table 2 Abilities attributes to describe the posture, technical capital and social capital of the stakeholders
Attributes Definition
Attributes qualifying the posture
Legitimacy (relevancy) Relevance of the stakeholder’s surveillance tasks as defined in the strategy regarding their mandate
(governmental bodies) or activities (private sector, research institutes).
Commitment/leadership Level of willingness of the stakeholder to contribute to the fight against ABR and to act on implementing
the surveillance tasks
Confidence Level of confidence placed by the stakeholder in the success of the surveillance strategy based on (1)
capacities of the stakeholders involved, (2) availability of resources, (3) willingness of stakeholders to act
against ABR and to collaborate, (4) current situation regarding antibiotics use (including regulation in place)
Attributes qualifying the technical capital
Capacities Level of technical capacities of the stakeholder to efficiently undertake surveillance tasks
Resources Level of resources (material, human and financial) available to the stakeholder to efficiently implement
surveillance tasks
Knowledge Level of understanding of the stakeholder regarding (i) the ABR issue in general and in the context of
Vietnam, (ii) the Vietnamese strategy to combat ABR, (iii) surveillance objectives for ABR, (iv) the added
value of implementing a collaborative approach compared to a more conventional one.
Attributes qualifying the social capital
Power Level of influence of the stakeholder on the implementation of the strategy
Flexibility Level of freedom of the stakeholder to develop inter-sectoral and inter-disciplinary collaborations or
public-private partnerships, especially in the field of ABR surveillance
Willingness to collaborate across
sectors and disciplines
Level of interest of the stakeholder to develop collaborations across sectors and disciplines, and especially
in the field of ABR surveillance
Trust Level of trust shown by other stakeholders with regard to this stakeholder based on the latter’s capacities,
resources and willingness to collaborate.
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study, that the frontier between these notions, used to
qualify social stakeholders’ abilities, is loose and porous,
as illustrated in Table 2 here below.
Based on informants’ perspectives only, we charac-
terised each of the 4 professional categories according to
abilities attributes, and identified trends in their percep-
tions and position regarding the government’s strategy.
Private sector
Posture Private sector stakeholders (both in human and
animal activities) clearly understand the public health
threat and the stakes at play regarding ABR and demon-
strate their interest in joining the combat against ABR.
To defend their commercial interests, some are already
engaged in a process of public-private partnership with
the authorities and antibiotic users to search for alterna-
tives and to promote changing practices. However, they
perceive challenges in implementing the national strat-
egy in Vietnam, such as inappropriate legal instruments
and regulations, conflicts of interest, under-staffed in-
spection bodies, etc. They deplore the heavy administra-
tive Vietnamese procedures and the lack of consultation
when establishing new regulations.
Technical capital Private sector stakeholder seem to be
very well prepared to face the ongoing and upcoming
regulatory requirements that come with the implementa-
tion of the surveillance strategy. They are already com-
puting data on antibiotic importation, production and
sales which are partially reported to the relevant author-
ities (especially to the customs), on a regular basis or on
specific request. “Customs have the best data files in
Vietnam”. They argue that they do not foresee any diffi-
culties in reporting more detailed data if requested by
the government as they can easily comply with this re-
quirement without any additional resources.
Social capital Human pharmaceutical companies are
well organised within a powerful professional organisa-
tion on which they can rely to handle concerted discus-
sions with the government when needed. Most of them
underline their willingness to actively collaborate with
the government and end-users. Other stakeholders in-
volved in the national strategy globally value their ex-
perience, the quality of the data they can share and their
capacity to assist in the field.
National research institutes
Posture National research institutes have been requested
to support the different official surveillance components
in their respective field of competencies. Globally, national
research institutes are highly committed to implementing
the tasks assigned; some have also engaged in activities
that surpass their mandates and have taken over the role
initially assigned to certain competent authorities, consid-
ering that the national strategy is currently insufficient or
is being implemented too slowly.
Stakeholders working in research institutes are mainly
motivated to improve the health situation in Vietnam and
are trying to bring scientific evidence to policy-makers to
push the surveillance strategy ahead. Nevertheless, re-
search institutes complain about the poor consideration
given to the scientific evidence and technical reports for
the design of regulatory measures. They feel that even
though the regulatory framework is roughly established,
authorities are finding it difficult to implement.
Some of them regret the absence of an official risk as-
sessment agency that could provide scientific and tech-
nical support to authorities that do not hold the
appropriate skills to implement surveillance activities. In-
dependently of the Global Action Plan, some stakeholders
involved in the human sector are working to establish a
multi-disciplinary and inter-sectoral group to facilitate in-
formation sharing and to advise the government.
They also foresee conflicting commercial interests for
the public and private stakeholders of the antibiotics
market chain; this poses a threat regarding interventions
that aim to reduce the use of antibiotics.
Technical capital Researchers usually have a good un-
derstanding of the ABR issue and the need to set up a
multi-compartment surveillance system, but their expec-
tations and the added value to be derived from a sys-
temic approach remain unclear. The national strategy is
usually well known but limited to the sectors in which
the stakeholders work.
The stakeholders in charge of ABR in the research in-
stitutes are usually well trained (many have an inter-
national degree), mainly in microbiology or infectiology,
rather than in epidemiology and surveillance. They
benefit from substantial technical support from inter-
national organisations and bilateral collaborations.
Furthermore, institutes officially tasked with surveil-
lance activities do not receive additional governmental
budgets to handle these activities, which are mainly fi-
nanced with external funds, and they fear that the gov-
ernment will not guarantee funding once these projects
have come to a term.
Social capital In each sector, researchers in national in-
stitutes are usually very well socially inter-connected
with governmental officers, as they have been studying
and/or working together for a while.
National research institutes show an interest in surveil-
lance data from other sectors but are rarely engaged in
collaborative data sharing processes. When questioned on
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their form of collaboration, they mention the sharing of
results during scientific meetings or through reports and
publications.
The fact that international bodies usually develop part-
nerships with a single institution is considered to induce
discrepancies among national research institutes regard-
ing resources, visibility and also access to high-level gov-
ernmental bodies.
International partners
Posture Informants have official mandates to support
the development of ABR surveillance or have lengthy
experience in working on the topic of ABR. At the
inter-governmental level, the role of each organisation is
clearly defined within the framework of the OIE-
FAO-WHO tripartite.6 Most surveillance activities in
Vietnam stem from international initiatives, which
have usually been endorsed by the government at a
high policy level.
They strongly acknowledge ABR as a top health priority
and are committed to supporting and assisting the Viet-
namese government to address this global challenge. They
consider the implementation of the surveillance strategy
as a long-term process, and they identify several barriers
to its operationalisation, such as the lack of legal instru-
ments to define the role and responsibilities of each stake-
holder, or the absence of a regulatory framework to
manage data collection on antibiotic consumption in the
human and animal sectors. They acknowledge that the na-
tional authorities are committed to improving the situ-
ation and have noticed that the allocation of national
resources is increasing. International partners perceive a
strong divergence in institutional cultures between depart-
ments, within and between ministries.
In the human health sectors, international activities
mainly focus on improving knowledge on the resistance
of bacteria and very few initiatives are dedicated to the
collection of data on antibiotic consumption.
Technical capital International research partners have a
very good technical understanding of the ABR-related is-
sues. They also have extensive knowledge of the Viet-
namese strategy to combat ABR when it comes to their
professional sector. Nevertheless, they usually lack a sys-
temic approach to the surveillance system and struggle
to clearly identify the potential added value of a collab-
orative approach for surveillance.
In the intergovernmental organisations, ABR focal
points are aware of what is going on in the other sectors
and have a clear vision of the type of collaboration they
foresee as relevant. They consider that the main tech-
nical issue for integrated ABR surveillance is to obtain
quality data in each sector. Focal points do not usually
have specific expertise in surveillance systems and thus
contract technical experts to support the authorities in
setting up the surveillance activities within the frame-
work of funded projects.
Social capital International partners work closely with
the government, which acknowledges how essential their
support is. However, their surveillance activities are usu-
ally part of a broader project with pre-determined activ-
ities and the allocation of specific funds. They therefore
often lack the flexibility required to engage in actions
that are not directly in line with their project require-
ments, such as inter-sectoral actions which remain
largely neglected. It is also to be noted that, even if the
tripartite FAO-OIE-WHO calls for more inter-sectoral
collaboration, the country offices or the regional repre-
sentations do not have a specific budget to achieve this.
Projects implemented at country level are usually shaped
by international and regional strategies that provide little
flexibility to adapt actions to the national context.
International partners work in close collaboration, not-
ably within the tripartite agreement to combat ABR. At
the national level, FAO and WHO work within the same
office and this is considered to facilitate the sharing of
information. In the human sector, international partners
meet monthly for a mutual update on their respective
surveillance activities.
Governmental authorities
Posture Generally speaking, governmental stakeholders
have taken action to comply with their assigned tasks re-
garding surveillance activities. Even though ABR is not
considered to be a health crisis in the strict sense of the
term, all stakeholders acknowledge the need to join
forces in tackling ABR. Progress in this direction is
therefore underway, notably thanks to the role played by
international partners.
Technical capital The leading departments within the
different Ministries have good knowledge on the Viet-
namese strategy to combat ABR and on the complex
ABR-related issues. They usually attend workshops orga-
nised by other sectors, which provides them with insight
into recent developments in the field of ABR. However,
they have a limited understanding of the added value of
setting up a One Health surveillance system in Vietnam.
Participants reported that surveillance in hospitals re-
ceives much more attention from government and inter-
national partners than surveillance at the community
level. The major reasons reported are the technical and
ethical constraints related to taking samples among
healthy humans. Surveillance activities in hospitals are
partly funded by city and provincial governments, which
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may have different resources and allocation priorities.
The financial discrepancies between hospitals are con-
sidered to impact technical capacities and thus the qual-
ity and standardisation of data collection across the
country.
Governmental officers also benefit from international
capacity building programmes; however, the turnover of
key surveillance stakeholders within governmental of-
fices, together with the lack of appropriate human re-
sources management, do not support the maintenance
of competencies and knowledge at the institutional level.
Social capital The importance and influence of the dif-
ferent governmental authorities are highly correlated
with the support they may obtain from international or-
ganisations. At the same time, they have to struggle with
hierarchical schemes and pressure due to chains of com-
mand and heavy administrative procedures. For instance,
when dealing with a cross-cutting issues, they are
obliged to set up inter-sectoral committees; certain
stakeholders consider that these are too resource and
time-consuming and are not adapted to operational sur-
veillance: “They talk a lot but don’t do much”.
Relationships among Ministries and departments are
very diverse. For instance, departments belonging to the
same or to different ministries may have no history of
collaboration or they may have a long-standing history
of tension and conflict. Collaboration is mostly limited
to the sharing of results across sectors during meetings
and workshops.
Regarding relationships with private companies, there
remains a need to build trust in the quality of national
data, the equality of law enforcement, as well as in the
framework of the mandatory consultation process asso-
ciated to regulation issuing (which is largely considered
to be ‘window-dressing’).
Factors influencing the implementation of the
surveillance strategy
Based on the analysis of the abilities of KASS to comply
with the strategy, we identified seven factors that may
act as barriers or levers to the implementation of the
collaborative surveillance strategy.
Governance and operational model for the One Health
strategy
The Ministry of Health oversees the implementation of
the inter-ministerial action plan, while it has no author-
ity over other ministries. Informants considered that this
governance model does not promote synergies across
ministerial strategies. Furthermore, they mentioned that
the National Steering Committee is dedicated to stra-
tegic discussions at a high policy level. An operational
framework is missing to support technical collaboration.
Some sub-committees have been set up to manage the
technical implementation of the strategy, but most of
these are mainly sectoral and not functional. In Vietnam,
it is quite common to set up a National Steering Com-
mittee to support inter-sectoral collaboration in the
event of a crisis that demands an emergency response,
like in the case of highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI). It might not be adapted to the fight against
ABR, which is not acknowledged as a health crisis by the
government, as emphasized by several stakeholders.
The inter-sectoral governance model for ABR is new
and does not benefit from a prior inter-sectoral back-
ground. Departments which are officially in charge of the
implementation of the Global Action Plan, respectively in
the animal and human health sectors, have no previous
experience of collaboration around a common health
issue. Following the avian influenza crisis, some collabora-
tive mechanisms have been established and are framed by
regulatory documents that precisely stipulate the roles
and responsibilities of the two sectors.7 Nevertheless,
these existing mechanisms have not been mobilised and
adapted to support the collaborative surveillance system
for ABR.
Co-existence of divergent institutional culture in
governmental institutions
Stakeholders reported the co-existence of divergent cul-
tures and competing agendas across governmental depart-
ments, belonging to the same or to different ministries.
This leads to little sense of mutual understanding and a
lack of common goals for surveillance activities. The lack
of collaboration between the department in charge of
curative medicine and the one in charge of preventive
medicine was a recurrent theme. Additionally, participants
reported that the department of livestock production and
the department of animal health have had divergent
perspectives regarding the ban of antibiotics in feed. Par-
ticipants regularly emphasized that some competent au-
thorities were “easier to collaborate with” than others and
were more open to discussions and knowledge sharing.
This perception suggests that the culture developed within
an institution also influences the willingness of its mem-
bers to collaborate.
This divergence of culture is mentioned much less fre-
quently between research institutes working in different
sectors and supervised by different ministries. They have
a long-standing experience of working together. During
interviews, they strongly acknowledged the need for
multi-disciplinary approaches in the field of ABR that
would yield tangible results regarding the development
of multi-disciplinary consortiums. This difference of pos-
ture between competent authorities and academia may
reflect the different types of expectations and motiva-
tions they demonstrate. For authorities, surveillance
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should be primarily sectoral in order to enable them to
meet their official mandates, such as managing animal
health or public health. For researchers, surveillance
yields knowledge which is expected to grow thanks to an
increasing range of data types and sources [14].
Level of knowledge
The willingness of some stakeholders to collaborate is
clearly held back by their lack of perception of the added
value to be found in collaborating across sectors in the
specific field of ABR surveillance, or of their ability to
identify relevant areas of collaboration for surveillance
activities. ABR has only recently attracted the attention
of policy-makers, and people working in the governmen-
tal organisations do not perceive how complex it is or
that it is necessary to work together to bring it under
control. Most of the stakeholders have limited expertise
in epidemiology and surveillance, which is a serious
drawback when seeking to set up a collaborative surveil-
lance system. Informants working in research institutes
and international organisations deplored the absence of
a national risk assessment agency and national reference
laboratories in the different sectors; such institutions
could efficiently bring scientific and technical support to
competent authorities in running the official surveillance
system and could advocate a more inter-sectoral ap-
proach to surveillance.
In Vietnam, the overuse of antibiotics in the animal
sector is considered to be the predominant driver of
antibiotic resistance in humans by most of the stake-
holders, although the intense pressure exerted by the
misuse in people is recognized to play a major role in
the development and maintenance of resistances. The
blame narrative is not helpful to favour a peaceful time
and does not support the development of a mutual re-
spect among sectors.
Technical capacities at the sectoral level
Participants often specified that their priority remains
the establishment or the strengthening of the surveil-
lance component that they oversee or are involved in.
Some of them underlined that effective sectoral compo-
nents in the different domains are a prerequisite to a
meaningful collaborative approach to surveillance. In
some domains, stakeholders also indicated that they
were not fully confident in the quality of the surveillance
data they were currently producing and so preferred not
to share it to avoid inappropriate use or controversy dur-
ing inter-sectoral meetings. Sharing data of poor quality
with other sectors and international partners was also
perceived as a risk to damage one’s reputation. The re-
cent nativity of the sectoral components is therefore
considered as an obstacle to a more collaborative ap-
proach, especially in terms of data sharing.
In some governmental departments, the turnover of
officers at key positions and the delay in assigning new
officers to take over the missions slow down collabor-
ation and the implementation of projects driven by
international partners.
Governmental financial support
Most surveillance components developed or under de-
velopment in Vietnam benefit from strong technical and
financial support from international partners. Stake-
holders deplored the lack of governmental resources
dedicated to sectoral surveillance activities and even
more dramatically to the implementation of the inter-in-
stitutional actions as envisaged in the national strategy.
Departments within each ministry are allocated a precise
budget, dedicated to activities in their jurisdiction only.
There is no targeted funding for collaborative actions,
such as the organisation of inter-sectoral work groups or
the establishment of a common database, as planned by
the strategy.
The lack of governmental resources forces institutions
to seek external funding for which they are sometimes
in competition with each other; this is perceived as an-
other barrier to collaboration and mutual trust. “We do
our things, they do theirs”.
Conflicting commercial interests
Antibiotic sales represent a large share of the incomes
for all the different stakeholders involved in the anti-
biotic production and marketing chains, both in the hu-
man and animal sectors: pharmacies, veterinary drug
stores, pharmaceutical companies and feed mills.
Pharmaceutical companies are both private and public,
as the State still owns some of the major companies that
import, produce and market drugs. In this context, com-
mercial interests were stated by participants to be a po-
tential barrier to the adhesion of some stakeholders,
especially those who are requested to report sales data
for ABU surveillance in the animal health sector.
International partners’ influence
International organisations, both governmental and aca-
demic, are very active in Vietnam in the field of ABR
surveillance. International partners are also strongly ad-
vocating for the implementation of an inter-sectoral ap-
proach to surveillance and for more involvement of the
private sector and the environmental authority in the
surveillance system.
Projects proposed by international partners might be
endorsed at high policy level without the consultation of
operational stakeholders. This leads to a lack of accept-
ability that in turn delays their implementation.
Participants deplored that inter-governmental organisa-
tions and donors usually support one single department
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on a bilateral basis. This excludes some stakeholders who
feel that they would also be legitimate to receive support
in this field. Additionally, this preference dedicated to spe-
cific institutions influences, in return, the financial support
of the government for one domain to the detriment of an-
other. As a result, some people are frustrated, tension ap-
pears across institutions, and this is not in favour of future
collaboration.
International partners recognised that they lack flexi-
bility to implement actions at the interface of different
sectors. Usually, projects have no dedicated budget for
cross-sectoral actions. When the need to support collab-
orative activities arises during the implementation phase,
accountability rules do not allow the allocation of funds
for unplanned actions.
Discussion
Benefits and biases of the iterative qualitative approach
Based on the analysis of the abilities and willingness
of stakeholders to comply with relevant strategies, we
identified 7 factors that may act as a barrier for its
operationalisation.
It is well recognised that cross-sectoral policies fail to
be implemented due to a lack of information on the sur-
rounding political and social environment. The mapping
and analysis of stakeholders provides information on key
target groups and players who will be impacted by a pro-
posed reform [15]. It helps to predict whether they
might support or block the implementation of the latter
and thus to propose strategies to promote supportive ac-
tions and decrease opposing actions.
The interviews were conducted using a participative
approach that enables participants to draw the system
they work in and the changes they would like to see in
terms of organisation and operations. In such an ap-
proach, the active participation of the interviewees fa-
vours their empowerment and helps to break down
barriers that may exist between respondents and investi-
gators in a more conventional interview. The drawing
encourages the participants to structure their answers
and the mapping of activities and interactions promotes
discussions on their perception of the surveillance sys-
tem [16]. Furthermore, this method enables the investi-
gator to reformulate information provided more easily
and allows the cross-checking of narrative data with the
information displayed in the drawing.
We are aware that these results should be interpreted
with caution as several factors may have biased them.
We assimilated people interviewed with the institution
they worked in, but there might be competitive views
and attitudes within each institution. Translation might
have also introduced some misunderstanding. We were
not able to interview some key operating stakeholders,
who did not agree to meet us. Finally, the surveillance
strategy is very dynamic in Vietnam with a lot of initia-
tives ongoing, and data collected might be rapidly out-
dated. However, we believe that the participatory
approach implemented in our study has positively im-
pacted the quality of the data collected and alleviated
some of these biases.
Challenges of perceiving added value in the collaborative
approach for ABR surveillance
Although ABR has been recognised as a global concern
that mandates global coordination [17], it can be consid-
ered as a new topic for both academic and governmental
stakeholders. Unlike other health hazards with well-inves-
tigated epidemiological links between the human, animal
and environmental domains and a clear need for collab-
orative surveillance, such as the West Nile virus [18, 19],
appropriate collaboration mechanisms are more difficult
to identify in the case of ABR surveillance [2]. Further-
more, in Vietnam, the key governmental stakeholders are
not the same as those involved in the fight against zoo-
notic diseases who have a long standing experience of col-
laboration, dating back to the emergence of HPAI and
who benefit from a legal framework that precisely defines
collaboration modalities7. The governmental officers en-
gaged in the fight against ABR must therefore be made
aware of the necessity of working beyond their institu-
tional boundaries, when it comes to health issues, under
the shared responsibility of several professional sectors.
Despite the alarming figures available on the costs and
deaths incurred by resistant bacteria [20, 21], the imme-
diate and visible impacts of ABR on health and econom-
ics, as compared to other hazards such as HPAI or
cancer, are not always clear to stakeholders. As such, it
is not a health issue that induces panic and fear in civil
society. According to Jerolmack [22], this may act as a
barrier to collaboration across sectors, as human and
animal health agencies are more successful in aligning
their priorities and actions when facing severe disease
events. As has also been highlighted for other One
Health topics, establishing inter-sectoral collaboration in
“non-crisis periods” is really challenging [23].
Necessity to tailor the collaborative surveillance system
to the objective and context
This study underlined that the sectoral surveillance
components are not yet well established in Vietnam.
Each sector concentrates its efforts on developing or
strengthening its own surveillance activities. Operational
and efficient sectoral surveillance components are cer-
tainly needed to further establish a One Health surveil-
lance system [2]. Nevertheless, inter-sectoral and inter-
disciplinary collaboration should not be neglected at this
early stage of the surveillance development as this would
promote the understanding of ABR as being a “hybrid”
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issue and help in the development of common goals for
its surveillance. To the contrary, the fragmentation of the
problematic across different institutions with different or-
ganisational cultures would result in an institutional
silo-oriented response, shaped by inter-sectoral conflicts
and tension over jurisdictions, resources and reputation.
Consequently, institutions would struggle to build inter-
sectoral and inter-disciplinary bridges when the need to
collaborate arises in the future [22]. An inter-sectoral
framework should be defined at this early stage of the im-
plementation of the national ABR surveillance system. It
could support and guide the stakeholders towards increas-
ing levels of cross-sectoral collaboration, as and when the
sectoral surveillance components improve and the collab-
orative surveillance objectives evolve.
The complex epidemiology of ABR undeniably calls for
a global approach to surveillance in line with the One
Health concept [24]. Nevertheless, and especially in the
case of ABR, One Health surveillance should not be sys-
tematically assimilated with integrated surveillance, which
suggests the unification of all possible surveillance compo-
nents within a single and global system (Bordier M,
Uea-Anuwong T, Binot A, Hendrikx P, Goutard FL: Char-
acteristics of one health surveillance systems: a systematic
literature review. Prev Vet Med., unpublished). ABR sur-
veillance is characterised by the co-existence of several
sectoral surveillance components collecting different types
of data with various methods and to answer specific sec-
toral objective(s). Bodies acting and inter-acting in these
surveillance components demonstrate different priorities,
expectations and constraints. A sustainable and relevant
One Health surveillance system thus requires the articula-
tion of the different sectoral components together around
a common surveillance objective, defined in a con-
certed manner with the different stakeholders, rather
than their fusion into a single system [14]. Appropri-
ate collaboration modalities must then be established
depending on this objective, while taking into account
the implementation context (Bordier M, Uea-Anu-
wong T, Binot A, Hendrikx P, Goutard FL: Character-
istics of one health surveillance systems: a systematic
literature review. Prev Vet Med., unpublished). As a
matter of fact, collaboration leading to the harmonisa-
tion and combination of data from different sources
would undoubtedly improve knowledge on transmis-
sion routes and risk factors related to ABR [2]. How-
ever, this should not be done at the expense of the
surveillance objective and purpose in each respective
sector where priority remains at this stage the reduc-
tion of antibiotic consumption and resistance spread
in domains under their jurisdiction.
Within the One Health tripartite partnership, inter-
national organisations could support countries in estab-
lishing appropriate governance models and in identifying
the necessary technical collaborations across sectors, de-
pending on their national surveillance context [25].
Guidance framework to support stakeholders in the
operationalisation of One Health surveillance
The study suggests that a collaborative surveillance sys-
tem for ABR in Vietnam can only be operationalised in
a sustainable manner if the full adhesion of the KASS is
obtained and if appropriate financial, human and mater-
ial resources are available.
The willingness of KASS to engage in this collabora-
tive strategy relies on two social conditions: firstly, there
must be mutual understanding and trust across institu-
tions and sectors; secondly, stakeholders should perceive
the added-value of working beyond their sectoral and
disciplinary boundaries, without fearing a loss of their
autonomy and leadership within their jurisdiction. Col-
laboration is resource-consuming both in terms of hu-
man and financial resources, and working with people
from different cultures and areas of expertise cannot be
achieved without stepping out one’s comfort zone [22].
As a result, stakeholders need to see the benefits of linking
up to each other to compensate for the cost of their
collaborative efforts. In Vietnam, the establishment of a
scientific and technical inter-sectoral platform could help
to remove organisational barriers and create a climate of
trust, by providing a place for exchange and discussions.
Along with its networking function, this platform could
also play the role of a national risk assessment agency, in
charge of supporting the authorities in the operating of
the surveillance system: identification of appropriate mo-
dalities for collaboration, provision of scientific evidence
and technical assistance to the government for the con-
ception of surveillance protocols and for the inter-sectoral
interpretation of the data, conducting of technical and
economic evaluations of the surveillance system.
The translation of stakeholder adhesion into sustain-
able collaborative actions requires an appropriate frame-
work for the governance and the operation of the
surveillance system. Adequate governance modalities are
needed to define the collaborative strategy and to pro-
vide necessary guidance and resources for its implemen-
tation. In Vietnam, the National Steering Committee
should be chaired at the Prime Ministry level to ease the
implementation of the global action plan and to ensure
synergies across ministerial strategies. A regulatory
framework should be defined accordingly to clearly state
the role and responsibilities for all stakeholders (author-
ities, national reference laboratories, national research
institutes, private sector) in the implementation of the
strategy. Financial mechanisms should be established
and approved at a high policy level to ensure the alloca-
tion of appropriate resources to surveillance activities,
including those requiring inter-sectoral collaboration.
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Based on the situation analysis, Fig. 2 proposes a guid-
ance framework to support the operationalisation of sus-
tainable One Health surveillance for ABR in Vietnam.
Some of the barriers to collaborations specifically identi-
fied through this study are not context dependant as
they are also described for other hazards and in different
socio-economic setting [26]. This guidance framework
could also serve as guidance for the implementation of
other surveillance systems requiring collaboration across
sectors and disciplines. However, the study has
highlighted the benefits of conducting a stakeholder
mapping and analysis using an iterative approach, to
capture the contextual factors as well as stakeholder per-
ceptions that may influence collaboration in order to
identify relevant recommendations to favour the imple-
mentation of a One Health surveillance system.
Conclusions
Adhesion of key social stakeholders to an integrated
surveillance system for ABR, as promoted by inter-
national organisations, appears to be challenging in the
Vietnamese context. To lever and promote successful
inter-sectoral collaboration, a participatory “learning by
doing” process could be applied to guide, frame and
mentor stakeholders through the identification of the
appropriate level of collaboration depending on the ex-
pected positive impacts on the surveillance value. Such an
approach should be designed within an adequate meth-
odological and conceptual framework, as proposed in par-
ticipatory modelling for instance [27]. This method has
been designed for collective decision-making, research
and institutional coordination. The main idea is that par-
ticipatory modelling, by rendering explicit the biological
processes as well as stakeholders’ strategies and social rela-
tionships, can be used by stakeholders themselves to deal
with their own problems and to identify mutually accepted
solutions that can lead to collective action. In the context
of ABR surveillance in Vietnam, this would probably help
to improve trust among stakeholders and their under-
standing of the benefits to be gained from an
inter-sectoral approach, through the concerted definition
of practical collaboration modalities and mechanisms, ac-
cepted and endorsed by all and one. This approach would
progressively lead to the development of an inter-sectoral
and multi-disciplinary community of practices, which
would support the implementation and operation of a
consensual collaborative surveillance system for ABR in
Vietnam. The establishment of a scientific and technical
inter-sectoral platform could provide an appropriate frame
to implement this mentoring approach.
Stakeholder mapping and analysis, followed by the par-
ticipatory modelling process, would appear to be a promis-
ing approach through which to engage stakeholders with
different backgrounds and expectations in a collaborative
surveillance system. The first tool provides an exhaustive
overview of the relevant stakeholders as well as the barriers
that may impede their adhesion to collaboration. Based on
this result, and using participatory workshops, different sce-
narios can be co-designed with the stakeholders to seek col-
lective solutions to raise these barriers and to move towards
a One Health surveillance system with a well-balanced ob-
jective and an acceptable level of integration, that comes as
close as possible to meeting expectations.
Endnotes
1Aide Memoire – Multi-stakeholder engagement to
combat Antimicrobial Resistance in Viet Nam - Hanoi,
June 24th 2015.
2Ministry of Health – National Action Plan on com-
batting drug resistance in the period 2013–2020.
3Ministry of Agriculture and rural development – Na-
tional Action Plan for management of antibiotic resist-
ance in livestock production and aquaculture – Decision
n°2625/QD-BNN-TY date June 21st 2017.
4Possible value of the variable “Stakeholder’s structural
position in the surveillance strategy” in Table 1
5Several possible informants for one type of stakeholder.
6http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas_work/antimicro-
bial-resistance/tripartite/en/ (Accessed 26 June 2018).
7Circular No. 16/2013/TTLT-BYT-BNN&PTNT: “Guide-
lines for coordinated prevention and control of zoonotic
diseases”. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development,
Ministry of Health.
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